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Norval Morris's Contributions to Sentencing Structures,
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Benjamin N. Berger
Professor of
Criminal Law,
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Minnesota Law
School
As a disciple and former student of Norval Morris, it is a
great honor to be asked to assess his contributions to sen-
tencing. As the title of this essay suggests, Morris's ideas
encompassed sentencing structures, theory (sentencing
purposes), and practice (sentencing outcomes). In all
three of these domains, the key to creating a just, work-
able, and enduring sentencing system is balance, and
balance is the essence of Morris's approach.
Morris's proposed sentencing structures allow for
shared policy-making and case-level authority between
the legislature, executive and administrative agencies
(corrections departments and officials, sentencing com-
missions, parole boards), trial courts, appellate courts,
prosecutors, and defenders. With respect to purposes,
modem sentencing systems must accommodate a wide
variety of important but often conflicting goals, both ret-
ributive (desert-based) and nonretributive. The latter
include not only purposes that seek to prevent crime-
through deterrence, moral teaching (norm-definition and
reinforcement), incapacitation, and/or rehabilitation and
reintegration-but also other purposes such as restora-
tive and community-oriented justice that have valuable
effects beyond crime control. Morris's hybrid theory pro-
vides substantial scope for the pursuit of all of these
purposes.
Another critical dimension, related to both structure
and purposes, reflects the eternal conflict between rule
and discretion. There is great value in a system in which
similarly situated offenders receive similar sentences (uni-
formity or equality goals), and where sentencing outcomes
are reasonably predictable (deterrent and resource-man-
agement goals). But discretion and flexibility are also
valuable, allowing courts and other officials to tailor the
specific sentence to the infinitely variable and unpre-
dictable facts and circumstances of individual cases.
Morris sought to craft sentencing procedures that strike a
balance between rule and discretion. Finally, with respect
to sentencing outcomes, Morris sought a better mix of
custodial and noncustodial alternatives, and his overall
principle of sentencing parsimony recognized that the
need to protect and respect the rights of crime victims and
the public must be balanced against the costs and destruc-
tive effects of punishment.
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The first part of this essay summarizes Morris's writ-
ings on sentencing, with particular emphasis on his
theory of limiting retributivism. The second part moves
from theory to practice and describes how Morris's theory
was successfully implemented under the Minnesota Sen-
tencing Guidelines-without, as far as I can tell, any key
policy maker ever expressly citing or crediting Morris.
However, several possible indirect Morris influences on
the Guidelines can be identified. The concluding section
of the essay stresses a critically important feature of the
Minnesota Guidelines that has no counterpart in Morris's
theory (resource-impact assessments); notes some impor-
tant ways in which Minnesota did not go as far as Morris
would have liked; and considers the future of the Morris-
Minnesota model.
I. Summary of Morris's Writings on Sentencing
Over a period of more than forty years, Norval Morris
addressed all of the most important issues of sentencing
policy and practice.' His first books and articles, published
in the early 195os, recognized the problems of sentencing
disparity, the unresolved conflicts between sentencing
purposes, and the need for sentencing theory and policy to
be informed by sentencing practice, building on the accu-
mulated wisdom of the past. Morris's earliest writings also
argued that judges should give reasons for their sentences,
subject to appellate review-two procedural reforms
which would later become important elements of many
sentencing guidelines systems. Over the next two decades,
Morris's writings developed another major theme-his
attack on the excesses of discretion and severity resulting
from traditional, rehabilitation-centered indeterminate
sentencing regimes. To prevent these excesses, he argued
that retributive values-the offender's just deserts-must
establish a firm upper limit on sentencing severity. Morris
further questioned traditional parole release discretion
because he doubted the effectiveness of in-prison treat-
ment programs and the ability of parole boards to
accurately assess progress toward rehabilitation. He also
continued to argue for noncustodial sentencing altema-
tives and for shorter, and nonmandatory, custody terms.
Morris's theory of Limiting Retributivism was implicit
in the early writings summarized above, but he provided a
more comprehensive statement of the theory in his semi-
nal book, The Future of Imprisonment, published in 1974. I
was a recent law school graduate at the time, and reading
Morris's book was like Revelation-finally, sentencing the-
ory made sense! Judging by the influence the book has
had, I am not the only one who had that reaction.
Here are the key elements of his theory as stated in his
1974 book and in later writings:2
1. Sentences must not be undeserved, but desert is
imprecise-Morris argued that in any given case
there will be widespread agreement that certain
penalties are clearly undeserved (either excessively
severe or excessively lenient), but there may be little
political and philosophical consensus on the
offender's precise deserts. Morris also recognized
the goal of equality in sentencing. But as with
desert, he saw this not as a precise imperative but
only a general guiding principle-like cases
should be treated alike... unless there are other
substantial utilitarian reasons to the contrary";
unequal penalties can still be "just" 3 Morris's lower
desert limits appeared to be flexible and based in
part on utilitarian, standard-setting considerations
(so as not to "depreciate the seriousness" of the
crime4).
2. Within the range of deserved (or not undeserved)
penalties, Morris would allow all other traditional
sentencing purposes to be considered, especially
general deterrence, subject to an overall, limiting
principle of humaneness and economy which he
called "parsimony"-the sentence imposed should
be no more severe than necessary to achieve these
other purposes. In practice, this means that judges
should start at the low end of the range of deserved
penalties and only increase the sentence as needed
to achieve non-desert-based sentencing purposes.
3. Morris maintained that clinical or other highly indi-
vidualized predictions of dangerousness are
inherently unreliable and overinclusive; therefore,
such predictions should rarely be a basis to impose
or prolong a prison term. He was willing to abolish
parole release discretion but stipulated that if it
were retained, the timing of release should be based
on actuarial predictions of risk; moreover, such pre-
dictions and a proposed initial parole date should be
settled within a few weeks of the offender's arrival
in prison. In any case, Morris would retain a parole-
like period of conditional release. However, it
should be a fixed period rather than the remaining
prison term; the latter, more traditional approach
tends to give the shortest supervision terms to the
highest-risk (most parole-delayed) offenders, and
vice versa.
4. Morris continued to attack the "rehabilitative ideal"
of compelled in-prison treatment tied to discre-
tionary parole release. He argued that all prison
treatment programs should be voluntary and that a
prisoner's apparent progress in treatment should
not affect the timing of his release. Morris felt that
involuntary treatment programs wasted resources
on unamenable offenders and encouraged them to
cynically "act" rehabilitated. With or without treat-
ment, he believed that in-prison behavior and
attitudes provide no sound basis for predicting the
offender's postrelease risk of reoffending. However,
Morris did recognize the need to maintain prison
order by granting good-conduct credits, and he also
stipulated that inmates could be required to take
part in prescribed treatment programming long
enough to see if they might want to continue. And
he also strongly supported community-based treat-
ment programs and would allow attendance at such
programs to be a condition of probation or post-
prison release.
5. Although he rejected highly discretionary, individu-
alized assessments of dangerousness and need for
treatment, Morris would allow enhanced sentences
based on the offender's prior conviction record. He
viewed such enhancements as deserved but also as
a means of incapacitating higher-risk offenders-
prior offending is the best predictor of future
offending but, as with parole release, such predic-
tions should be made on an actuarial rather than an
individualized basis.
6. As noted, Morris believed that sentences should be
subject to appellate review, in order to improve sen-
tencing consistency and ensure that desert and
parsimony limits are respected. Morris also believed
that appellate decisions would, through the time-
honored, common-law process, help to develop and
improve sentencing theory and jurisprudence.
7. As also noted, Morris argued that sentences would
be more consistent and principled, and appellate
review would be greatly facilitated, if trial courts
were required to state reasons for their sentences.
8. Morris opposed all mandatory penalties and cate-
goric exclusions from probation eligibility, whether
by statute or strict, legally binding guidelines.
Despite his career-long concerns about sentencing
disparity, he believed that judges must retain sub-
stantial discretion to consider case-specific facts and
circumstances.
9. In his 199o book with Michael Tonry,5 Morris built
upon his earlier advocacy of noncustodial sanctions.
That book explored and urged courts to employ a
wide range of intermediate sanctions less intrusive
than full-time incarceration but more intrusive than
traditional probation. In order to give courts guid-
ance and encourage wider use of such sanctions,
while still promoting sentencing uniformity, Morris
and Tonry proposed the concepts of interchangeable
sanctions and equivalency scales (e.g., one day of
home detention equals eight hours of community
service). Judges would first identify the primary sen-
tencing purposes applicable to the case and then
select the type of sanction or sanctions best suited
to achieving those purposes, using the equivalency
scales to ensure that equally culpable offenders
receive roughly similar sanction severity.
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io. Morris supported sentencing guidelines reforms
provided that they retained substantial judicial dis-
cretion, strongly promoted the use of intermediate
sanctions, included appellate review, and required
trial courts to state reasons for their sentences. Mor-
ris also appeared to recognize the value of having
such guidelines developed and monitored by a sen-
tencing commission with some independence from
the legislature, to at least partially insulate sentenc-
ing policy, and the determination of specific
guidelines sentences, from short-term political
pressures. Such insulation is especially important
when the recommended guideline sentence is "real
time," not subject to broad parole-release discretion.
Morris's sentencing model is comprehensive, thought-
ful, and well-balanced, but it has also had critics. Andrew
von Hirsch has repeatedly questioned how "limiting" Mor-
ris's model actually is-how wide is the "not undeserved"
sentencing range?6 Would traditional indeterminate sen-
tencing systems, with their very high statutory maximum
terms and specified minimum times to serve before
parole, be consistent with the model? If so, what has been
added? If not, how much further must the ranges be nar-
rowed? To some extent Morris resolved this ambiguity in
his later writings, endorsing sentencing guidelines under
the conditions summarized above.7 But American guide-
lines systems vary quite a bit in their range widths,
departure standards, and degree of legal binding force.8
Morris would probably reply that such diversity is a good
thing-specific sentencing structures, and the precise bal-
ance struck between rule and discretion, must ultimately
be decided by each jurisdiction, based on its particular his-
tory and current circumstances.
II. Morris's Model in Practice-Limiting Retributivism
under the Minnesota Guidelines
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, in effect since
198o, were said to be based on a theory of "modified just
deserts" 9 in which retribution is the "primary" sentencing
goal." The Sentencing Commission dearly based its
offense rankings and approved departure standards on
desert; the "modified" part of the model seems to refer to
the substantial weight the Commission gave to prior
record and resource management (staying within pro-
jected prison capacity) in its recommended Guidelines
prison durations and dispositions (executed versus sus-
pended prison terms).
The Commission did not cite Morris's writings in any
of its official reports, and I have not found any other evi-
dence that his writings directly influenced the
Commission's work. But as I have explained in more
detail elsewhere," the system designed by the Commission
bore a striking resemblance to Morris's model. And as that
system evolved over time, most of the changes made by
the Commission or by interpretive case law brought the
system even closer to his model. Similarly, the Minnesota
legislature did not endorse or appear to have been directly
influenced by Morris's ideas, either when it enacted the
1978 Guidelines-enabling legislation or when it passed
later sentencing and Guidelines-related statutes. But the
1978 act did appear to contemplate that Guidelines sen-
tencing would be a hybrid system, reflecting all of the
traditional purposes of sentencing while limiting case-spe-
cific discretion. Later statutes have tended to reaffirm the
importance of crime-control goals and the application of
case-specific discretion-thus making the system even
more of a "modified" desert hybrid.
A. Elements of Morris's Model in Minnesota's
Guidelines, Case Law, and Statutes
The legislature's implicit hybrid approach, combined
with the Commission's "modified just deserts" model and
refined over time by changes in the guidelines, interpre-
tive case law, and further sentencing legislation, has
produced an innovative sentencing structure that incorpo-
rates almost all of the key elements of Morris's model,
described above.
1. Sentences May Fall within a Substantial Range of
Deserved Penalties For the great majority of offenders
(70 to 8o percent, depending on the year) the Guidelines
recommend a suspended (stayed) prison term. The effec-
tive sentencing range in these cases is broad-with rare
exceptions there are no required or recommended proba-
tion conditions; judges have discretion to impose almost
any combination of conditions (which may include a jail
term of up to one year) or no conditions. The top of the
effective range is set by the recommended prison term
(currently twelve to forty-eight months, depending on the
grid cell) applicable when judges revoke probation, or ini-
tially depart and impose an executed prison term.
As for the 2o to 30 percent of offenders with recom-
mended executed prison terms, the range of penalties is
also quite broad. Although the sentence ranges for these
offenders were originally very narrow, they have been
widened in recent years, especially in response to the
Supreme Court's Blakely decision. In 198o the range in
most cells extended 4 to 7 percent above and below the
midpoint of the cell, and no cell ranges overlapped; today,
all cell ranges extend 15 percent below and 20 percent
above the midpoint, and the ranges overlap considerably.12
Even under the narrow ranges formerly in effect, the effec-
tive sentencing range was much broader. Charging and
plea bargaining are not regulated by the Guidelines or
statutes, so it is likely that charge and plea concessions
often yield penalties less severe than the lower end of the
range for the offender's conviction offense. The probable
effects of plea bargaining can be seen in the strong asym-
metry of durational and especially dispositional departure
rates-downward departures have always been much
more frequent than upward departures.'3 Moreover, the
available "real offense" data suggests that many other sen-
tences, even if formally not departures, are below the
range provided for the more serious offense(s) of which
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the offender would have been convicted but for charging
and plea bargaining concessions. 4
Notwithstanding the wide ranges available to Min-
nesota sentencing judges, desert sets a firm upper limit on
sanction severity-upward durational departures from
recommended stayed and executed prison terms must be
based on aggravating offense circumstances, not danger-
ousness, need for general deterrence, or other
non-desert-based considerations15
2. Nondesert Purposes and Parsimony Apply within
These Substantial Desert Ranges When sentencing
within the cell ranges for presumptive-prison cases, and in
setting conditions of probation, the Guidelines permit
judges to consider all of the traditional purposes of pun-
ishment. The Guidelines also expressly adopt the principle
of parsimony-judges should impose the least restrictive
sanction that will achieve the purposes of the sentence.
This principle applies both with respect to the use of cus-
todial sanctions (Minn. Guidelines S 1(3)) and in
determining probation conditions (id. S III.A.2).
Guidelines provisions defining allowable grounds for
departure suggest a focus on the offender's deserts. But
interpretive case law decided in the early 198os recognized
that courts may also depart dispositionally (but not dura-
tionally) upon a finding of the offender's particular
amenability or unamenability to probation. The former
permits downward departure (probation, instead of the
recommended prison term); the latter permits upward
departure (immediate execution of the recommended
stayed prison term). As I have argued elsewhere,' 6 this
case law is consistent with Morris's theory if we make the
following assumptions: First, desert limits are asymmet-
ric-upper limits are strict but the lower end of the desert
range is a flexible limit, permitting downward amenability
departures. Second, the duration of a recommended
stayed prison term is a deserved penalty given the
offender's conviction offense and prior record; thus,
upward, unamenability departures do not exceed desert
(and neither do probation revocations, even though they,
too, are often based on nondesert considerations).
3. The Imposition and Length of Prison Terms Rarely
Depends on Dangerousness Predictions Guidelines
departure standards do not allow judges to enhance rec-
ommended prison terms based on findings of offender
dangerousness.Y The Guidelines achieve such enhance-
ments only by means of the offender's criminal history
score-the kind of actuarial risk assessment that Morris
favored. Offender risk assessments are arguably an
implicit factor under the amenability case law described
above, but such risk is not, by itself, a basis for disposi-
tional or durational departure. A number of sentencing
laws enacted since 198o do allow judges to depart upward
from the duration of recommended prison terms based on
findings of offender dangerousness, but most of these
laws are narrowly tailored and infrequently applied.18
4. The Imposition and Length of Prison Terms Is Not
Based on Rehabilitation Assessments Recommended
Guidelines sentences and allowable departure grounds do
not allow judges to consider the offender's need for
extended, in-prison treatment,'9 although, as noted above,
particular amenability to probationary treatment is a
grounds for granting probation instead of the recom-
mended prison term (and all released offenders can be
required to participate in appropriate treatment pro-
grams). Nor does an offender's progress in treatment
affect how long he or she stays in prison; parole release
discretion was abolished (except for life sentences), and
prison terms may only be shortened via good-conduct
credits of up to one-third off the maximum time to serve.
Consistent with Morris's attack on coerced prison treat-
ment tied to parole release, the 1978 Guidelines-enabling
statute declared that all prison programs would become
voluntary and that nonparticipation in such programs
would not reduce good-conduct credit.
However, in 1993 the legislature backtracked, adopting
an intermediate position: inmates may lose good-conduct
credit not only for disciplinary infractions but also for
refusal to participate in prison programs. The revised Min-
nesota approach goes further than Morris's stipulation
that inmates should be encouraged to enter and stay in
programs long enough to see if they liked them. Still, the
award of program-participation credit seems to be an all-
or-nothing matter release dates do not depend on an
inmate's supposed progress toward rehabilitation.
5. Sentences Are Enhanced Based on Prior Record
Morris believed that it is appropriate to impose more severe
sanctions on previously convicted offenders, not only
because they deserve more punishment but also because
prior record is the best predictor of the offender's risk of
future crime. The Minnesota Guidelines give substantial
weight to criminal history in the determination of recom-
mended prison terms. Within grid rows, the presumptive
prison duration for the highest criminal history category is
on average twice as long as for the lowest category. More-
over, "prior" record under the Guidelines is defined as of
the date of sentencing, which allows multiple current
offenses to substantially enhance punishment even with-
out consecutive sentencing. In addition, criminal history
strongly influences Minnesota judges' decisions to depart
down or up from recommended Guidelines dispositions
(prison versus probation).20
Most desert theorists either reject prior record as a
basis for sentence enhancements or would give this factor
much less weight than it receives under the Guidelines.21
Morris dearly disagreed with the former view. But he
might be troubled by the strong role that prior record plays
in Minnesota sentencing, especially given the racially dis-
parate impact of this sentencing factor.22
6. All Sentences Are Subject to Appellate Review
Under the Guidelines, the prosecution and defense may
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both appeal from any sentence. In practice only about i
percent of sentences are appealed (in part because the
Supreme Court early on stated that it would rarely reverse
nondeparture sentences, and because many sentences are
mutually agreed to in plea bargaining). But such appeals
have been frequent enough not only to enforce Guidelines
policies but also to develop the kind of "common law of
sentencing" that Morris strongly advocated.
7. Sentencing Courts Must State Reasons All depar-
tures from the Guidelines must be supported by a
statement of reasons, on the record, showing that there
are "substantial and compelling circumstances" which
make the departure sentence more appropriate than the
recommended Guidelines sentence. Morris probably
would have gone further, requiring judges to give reasons
for every sentence, not just departures. Admittedly, his
views on this issue were initially developed in the context
of indeterminate sentencing; under the Guidelines it can
be argued that a nondeparture sentence is supported by
Guidelines policy and requires no case-specific reasons.
But stating reasons for not departing helps to ensure that
no exceptional circumstances are overlooked and facili-
tates appellate review; such reasons should at least be
required in cases where one or both parties have requested
a departure.
8. Sentencing Courts Retain Substantial Discretion
As noted above, the Guidelines give trial courts consider-
able discretion to tailor the sentence to the particular
offense and offender. Judges have almost total discretion
in choosing conditions of probation for the 70 to 8o per-
cent of cases with a recommended nonprison sentence,
and in the remaining (presumptive-prison) cases, grid cell
ranges are now quite broad. Relatively few cases are sub-
ject to mandatory minimum penalties, and in many of
these cases courts may sentence apart from the "manda-
tory" penalty by meeting the standard for Guidelines
departure.23 In these and all other cases, "substantial and
compelling reasons" are needed to depart, but courts often
find that such reasons exist, particularly reasons to depart
downward. In recent years about 30 percent of defendants
facing a presumptive-prison sentence have received proba-
tion, and 25 to 40 percent of defendants sent to prison had
a durational departure (more often down than up). These
forms of remaining judicial discretion are in addition to
the case-specific tailoring available through charging and
plea bargaining, which are not regulated by the Guide-
lines.
9. Courts Are Encouraged to Use Intermediate Sanc-
tions The Guidelines list and encourage judges to use a
wide variety of probation conditions. Use of such interme-
diate sanctions is facilitated by the broad discretion courts
retain, when choosing conditions of probation, and the
substantial power they exercise to depart from recom-
mended prison sentences. However, Minnesota could
have done more to encourage the use of such sanctions-
by providing, as some other states have done, guidance to
trial courts in the choice among these sanctions, and state
funding to the local court and correctional authorities who
often lack the necessary facilities and staff.24
10. Guidelines Are Developed and Monitored by an
Independent Sentencing Commission This was not
originally Morris's idea (Judge Marvin Frankel is com-
monly credited with it), but Morris became a strong
supporter of commission-based guidelines such as those
in Minnesota.
Minnesota's experience over almost three decades
shows the wisdom of the commission structure-insulat-
ing "real time" sentencing policy from short-term political
pressures; allowing sentencing policy to be guided by
detailed data collected and analyzed by expert staff and
commission members representing the public and all
parts of the criminal justice system; facilitating compre-
hensive policy making and priority setting (not ad hoc,
crime-of-the-week legislation); and promoting a long-term
perspective (not one driven by electoral or news cycles).
B. Morris and the Minnesota Guidelines-Causation
or Correlation?
As noted earlier, I have found no evidence that Minnesota
legislators, Sentencing Guidelines Commission members
and staff, judges, or other sentencing policy makers were
directly influenced by Norval Morris's sentencing theories.
So how did Minnesota end up with a system so similar to
his model? One possibility is that Morris's ideas strongly
influenced other sentencing scholars and model rules, and
that these people and rules, in turn, influenced many of
the key actors who shaped the Minnesota Guidelines.
There may also have been a sort of parallel evolution; Mor-
ris's methodology-the way in which he derived his
theories and proposals-was similar to the way in which
Minnesota policy makers derived the Guidelines.
A number of sentencing scholars directly contributed
to the work of the Minnesota Commission when it was
designing the Guidelines. (I was not one of them; my
career as a sentencing scholar began when the initial
Guidelines were proposed to the legislature, in January
198o.) One of the most frequent correspondents and con-
tributors was Michael Tonry. As is well known, Tonry was
a prot~g6 of Norval Morris, and the two worked closely
together from the mid-197os until Morris's death in 2004.
Still, I have found no concrete evidence that Tonry was
promoting Morris's sentencing theory in his communica-
tions with the Minnesota Commission. Indeed, as
indicated in Tonry's essay in this volume, it appears that
even Morris himself was not promoting his theory in the
.mock commission" project with which Morris and Tonry
were involved in 1977 to 1978. Nor is there evidence that
other frequent advisors to the Minnesota Commission,
such as Dan Freed and Andrew von Hirsch, were promot-
ing Morris's ideas; indeed, von Hirsch strongly favored a
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more purely retributive approach, which the Commission
rejected in favor of its Morrisonian, "modified just
deserts" model.
Perhaps the strongest link I have found between Mor-
ris's ideas and the decisions of Minnesota sentencing
reformers and policy makers is the second edition of the
American Bar Association's sentencing standards,5 which
obtained final approval in August of 1979-just as the
Minnesota Commission's proposals were beginning to
take shape. Most of the key elements of Morris's theory
and what would become the Commission's model were
present, including a generous sentencing range with firm
upper desert limits on sanction severity (lower limits
being more flexible, and based on not "depreciating"
offense seriousness); an overarching principle of parsi-
mony ("least restrictive alternative"); limits (albeit less
than Morris would have wanted) on extended-term sen-
tencing of dangerous offenders; for other offenders,
recidivism risk to be based on verified present or past
offending; allowing rehabilitative goals to be a basis for a
probation, but not a basis to impose or extend a custodial
sentence; cautious retention of parole release discretion,
requiring "early" setting of the offender's proposed release
date; two-way appellate review of sentences, to promote a
common law of sentencing; statements of reasons for sen-
tences; increased use of intermediate sanctions; a
permanent sentencing commission to promulgate and
oversee guidelines; and guidelines that incorporate inter-
mediate sanctions and have only "modest" legal effect,
leaving judges with a substantial amount of discretion. On
some of these points, the Commentary to the standards
explicitly stated that it was adopting Morris's views.26
Again, however, I have found no dear evidence that
Minnesota sentencing reformers and policy makers actu-
ally based their decisions on the ABA standards. And of
course, to some extent the causal arrow runs in the oppo-
site direction-Morris continued to refine his theory after
198o and came to endorse guidelines because they
seemed to be well designed and working well in Min-
nesota and other early guidelines states.
As for the elements of Morris's model which he had
identified before 198o, perhaps the best (or most parsimo-
nious) explanation for the adoption of these same elements
in Minnesota is parallel evolution. But given the way in
which Morris went about identifying and refining his prin-
ciples-his jurisprudential methodology-it was no
accident that sentencing reformers and other policy mak-
ers in a progressive, good-government state like Minnesota
would independently discover the same principles. Morris
was a reformer but also an empiricist and a realist. He first
sought to find out how judges and practitioners think and
act, so that his reforms might build on the accumulated
wisdom of the past and avoid proposing highly unpopular
or unworkable rules that would be ignored or circum-
vented in practice. Using this "from-the-ground-up,"
consensus-seeking approach, Morris identified fundamen-
tal and widely shared goals and values that must be
accommodated if a new sentencing system is to flourish
and survive. The practically minded people who crafted,
implemented, and refined Minnesota's Guidelines used a
similar approach and arrived at the same principles.
III. Conclusion
Although many features of the Minnesota Guidelines have
counterparts in Morris's theory, Minnesota also pioneered
a critical element that Morris did not foresee-the use of
prison-population impact assessments to guide drafting
and revision of guidelines rules and related sentencing
statutes. Such assessments became administratively feasi-
ble and more accurate under Minnesota-style guideline
sentencing, with its more predictable sentencing patterns,
substantial sentencing database, and expert commission
staff.
Prison impact assessments are especially important in
guidelines systems that abolish broad parole-release dis-
cretion; prison overcrowding and rapid growth must then
be controlled from the "front end." Such control also
allows policy makers to comprehensively consider all types
of crimes and set priorities in the use of limited correc-
tional resources. These benefits have led most other
guidelines states to implement resource-impact assess-
ments; indeed, this became a major reason to adopt
guidelines.
Although not foreseen by Morris, this feature of com-
mission-based guidelines may very well be what makes
sentencing parsimony actually work in practice, protecting
systems like Minnesota's from the dreaded "Zimring
eraser-the strong tendency of elected policy makers to
steadily escalate penalties which, in a determinate sen-
tencing system, translates directly into more severe
sentences imposed and served.7 Front-end impact assess-
ments and priority setting also help promote greater
proportionality across offense types.
In some respects Minnesota has not done as much as
Morris would have liked. Many important decisions
remain largely unregulated, including charging, plea bar-
gaining, conditions of probation, revocation of probation
and parole, and all misdemeanor sentencing decisions.
Minnesota remains extremely parsimonious in its use of
prison sentences but makes more frequent use of local jail
terms than Morris would have liked-these are the kinds
of cases (short custody terms, nonviolent offenders) for
which intermediate sanctions are particularly appropriate
and feasible. Minnesota has also backtracked on several of
Morris's central principles, enacting numerous laws allow-
ing "dangerous-offender" sentencing enhancements
and/or traditional parole release discretion, and steadily
escalating sex offender penalties with little regard for par-
simony and the upper limits of desert.2s Despite these
areas of disagreement and backsliding, however, Min-
nesota's sentencing system remains true to Morris's
model in most respects.
What will the future bring? Given the many benefits of
the Morris-Minnesota model, its endorsement in the ABA
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standards and the recent project to revise the Model Penal
Code, 29 and the proven ability of Minnesota-style guide-
lines to accommodate the added demands of Blakely v.
Washington,3" there is reason to believe that more states
will adopt this model. But will it survive in Minnesota and
the other states with similar systems already in place? That
will depend on whether these states continue to take a
comprehensive, long-term, data-informed view of sentenc-
ing policy and never lose sight of what these reforms have
accomplished and why they were adopted in the first
place.
Even if the Morris-Minnesota model spreads and sur-
vives, will these systems be as well constructed and
maintained as Minnesota's seems to have been? That will
depend, to a large extent, on the people working in these
systems. Norval Morris and Dan Freed can certainly be
described as sentencing policy giants. But Minnesota's suc-
cess depended on the vision, talent, and energy of its own,
homegrown giants-commissioners like (chair) Jan Smaby
and (member/Judge/Justice) Douglas Amdahl; dedicated
staff like Dale Parent, Kay Knapp, and Debra Dailey. Other
successful sentencing guidelines systems have likewise
found, and continue to find, their own giants.
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